The Ancestry of Marbury v. Madison by Denison, John H.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 6 Issue 7 Article 7 
July 2021 
The Ancestry of Marbury v. Madison 
John H. Denison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
John H. Denison, The Ancestry of Marbury v. Madison, 6 Dicta 24 (1928-1929). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE ANCESTRY OF MARBURY v. MADISON
By John H. Denison of the Denver Bar
(Former Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court)
ARSHALL was not the first judge to hold that the
supreme court had power to declare an act of congress
unconstitutional. The act of March 23, 1792, 1 Stat.
at Large, p. 223, relating to invalid pensions, provided "that
any officer, soldier or seaman * * * shall also be allowed such
farther sum for the arrears of pension * * * as the circuit court
of the district * * * may think just;" and made it the duty of
the judges of the circuit courts to remain five days at least,
from the opening of the session thereof to give full oppor-
tunity for the relief proposed by the act, and further "That
in any case where the Secretary (of War) should suspect im-
position or mistake, he should have power to withhold the
name of the applicant from the pension list and make report
of the same to congress at their next session.
The Circuit Court for the District of New York, consist-
ing of Jay, Cushing and Duane, took up this act. Jay was
then chief justice of the Supreme Court, Cushing was on that
bench and Duane was judge of the district court of New
York. They declined to act as a court under the above men-
tioned statute on the ground that "neither the legislative nor
the executive branches [of the federal government] can con-
stitutionally assign to the judicial any duties but such as are
properly judicial and to be performed in the judicial man-
ner;" that the duties assigned were not judicial because they
subjected the decisions of the court to consideration and sus-
pension by the secretary of war and to the legislature; that
no executive officer or even the legislature was authorized
"to sit as a court of errors on the acts and opinions of this
court." The judges then construed the act as appointing them
personally as commissioners and thus took it upon themselves
to carry out its provisions.
In Pennsylvania the circuit court, consisting of Wilson
and Blair, Justices of the Supreme Court, and Peters, District
Judge, addressed a letter to the President to the same effect,
except that they declined to act at all. The Circuit Court for
the District of North Carolina, consisting of Iredell, Asso-
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ciate Justice of the Supreme Court, and Sitgreaves, District
Judge, addressed a letter to the President, in which they set
forth the same matters, construing, obviously correctly, though
contrary to New York, the statute as referring to the court and
not to the judges of it. They nevertheless resolved to act as
commissioners on account of the serious consequences to "un-
fortunate and meritorious individuals" if they refused their
cause. Thereupon Attorney General Randolph moved for
mandamus in the supreme court of the United States against
the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, to compel
that court to obey the act. The supreme court took the matter
under advisement but before decision congress repealed the
act by the Act of Feb. 28th, 1793, 1 St. at Large, p. 374,
Hayburn's Case and Notes, 2 Dallas, 409.
The great constitutional question decided in Marbury v.
Madison, is said by Senator Beveredge not to have been essen-
tial to the decision of that case. Whatever may be true as to
that, it is certain that the circuit courts of New York and
Pennsylvania, with four of the five* supreme justices sitting
thereon, in refusing to perform the duties placed upon them
by an act of congress on the ground that that act was uncon-
stitutional, did not merely declare but held it to be so; that
their colleague, Iredell, agreed with them we know and we
know, therefore, that the supreme court of the United States
at that time was unanimous upon the point decided by Mar-
shall and his colleagues twenty years later. The importance
of this lies not in the fact that it adds the mere authority of
these judges to that of Marshall and his colleagues in support
of the. principle stated in Marbury v. Madison, but that it
shows that the maintenance of that principle was inevitable,
and that it was recognized in what Mr. Dallas, the reporter,
says was the first case in which the constitutional question was
presented, and was agreed to by all the judges upon exactly
the grounds which governed the opinion of the great Chief
Justice.
It is interesting also to note that in the Federalist the
proposition later declared by the courts is asserted and taken
for granted and made the basis of further deductions (Fedst.
Nos. 53 and 78).
*Johnson had then been appointed but had not qualified.
